A new NATO-debate
The attacks of 11th September 2001 marked the final end of the old NATO-politics. NATO was founded as an alliance to collectively defend the territory of its member states. With the end of the Cold War disappeared the main threat for an attack on that territory and NATO started searching for new aims. The member states decided in 2002 that NATO operations were not limited to its own territory or region but could take place everywhere. Our security is influenced globally and by consequence NATO has to operate globally, is the legitimating reasoning. Only four years later the US wants to go a step further with NATO.
Policymakers outlined the upcoming NATO-debate: One: If our security is influenced globally, why limit its partners or NATO-membership to the European region? Why do not ask Japan or Australia as new NATO members? In Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere co-operation with these countries already takes place. Why not broaden and structure this co-operation? Two: Till now every country bears itself the costs of its troops when they participate in a NATO-operation. Common funding is very limited. Why not have common funding for military operations independent of the participation of a country in an operation? Three: Now decisions are made by consensus and can one country block a NATO decision. A 'constructive abstainment' or majority decision making, would that not be more efficient? Four: With terrorism as new enemy the working area of NATO changes. Does NATO has to receive a place in the inner affairs policy against terrorism? Taken together these proposals are a frontal attack on the UN and the EU. NATO would develop from a European-American military alliance into a global collective security organisation. A 'United Nations of the willing', which would marginalise the existing United Nations. What would this mean for countries who do not participate in this military alliance and can potentially be defined by it as a security problem? For them this development is a threat which they will try to counter militarily on their turn. The results are a new arms race and a growing militarisation of the international relations. The proposition that threats are global could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. One: NATO as a global collective security organisation? After 11th September 2001 the US considered NATO as useless. They formed the 'coalition of the willing' and decided unilaterally to attack and occupy Iraq. Afterwards the US was confronted with the limits of this approach. The war costs too much, the US Army gets overstretched and the US was internationally isolated. The second term of Bush as president was marked by a new openess for co-operation. The US NATO-ambassador Nuland stated on 7th December 2005 in Le Monde that the Iraq discussions learned a lesson: NATO has to be the place where all future security problems have to be discussed. As examples she names the Middle-East, Iraq, Iran but also China and North-Korea. The German Chancellor Merkel supports this proposal1, as well as the Netherlands. The former Spanish prime minister Aznar takes in his report “NATO: An Alliance for Freedom”2 some steps further. He proposes to offer NATO membership to Israel and to make links with other countries active in the war against terrorism. As example he names Colombia and India. These ideas are not on the official NATO agenda yet, but show where hardcore Atlantics are aiming at. NATO secretary general De Hoop-Scheffer stated on the Munich Security Conference in 2006: “We need to ensure that we have the closest possible partnership with those countries that can, and are willing to, help defend our shared values. To my mind, that means also building closer links with other likeminded nations beyond Europe - nations such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea or Japan. NATO is not a global policeman, but we have increasingly global partnerships.”3 Contacts with the named countries are already taking place for a while. New Zealand and Australia signed the past months a treaty with NATO on exchange of classified information. A small technical step to ease the military co-operation but it was accompanied with statements about the aim to develop closer links. The ministers of foreign affairs of South Korea and Japan visited NATO in December and January. This proposal for closer links was already discussed inside NATO in January4. The US NATO-ambassador Nuland proposed a permanent panel with these countries.Now these proposals have made it to the official agenda10. New partnerships and new formats for older ones were discussed at the informal NATO summit of ministers of foreign affairs in Sofia on 27-28 April11. And the discussion is clearly placed on the agenda for the Riga summit. These steps are not as evident as it may sound. Partnerships with Japan and Australia give NATO suddenly a role in the Pacific and change fundamentally our relation with China. Membership, allthough not on the agenda now, would imply that the collective defense guarantee is broadened to countries in the Pacific. It turns NATO in a worldwide military alliance. Europe would automatically be dragged into a conflict in the Pacific. The First World War showed how a local conflict can grow into a global one through local military alliance treaties. Military circles in the US often predict that the next great conflict will be with China. Do we really want to be part of that? Till now we have one global security organisation, the United Nations. Security problems are treated by the Security Council. When consensus on security problems is first formed in a global NATO, the discussion in the Security Council will be reduced to a pro forma exercise to legitimate a NATO decision or operation. When Russia or China are unwilling to give this legitimation, it will be tempting to act alone as NATO. NATO would become the main global security organisation with its own military apparatus, while the most important political contradictions are laid outside the organisation. What would be the reaction of countries who do not belong to the 'willing' or the 'chosen'? How is it to be outside of the 'right' side? They will be confronted with a global military alliance who can consider them as a security problem. They will try to defend. Result is an arms race and a militarisation of the international relations. Two: 'Common Funding'? The second proposal in the debate on a new NATO concerns common funding. At this moment every country bears itself the costs for the troops it contributes to a NATO operation. Only a limited amount of infrastructure is funded through a common budget, like the AWACS-planes or the storage bunkers for US nuclear weapons in Europe. NATO Secretary General De Hoop-Scheffer5, the US NATO-ambassador Nuland6 and the NATO Supreme Commander in Europe Jones7 state that this way of financing limits participation in operations. With common funding would smaller countries be able to contribute easier to operations. De Hoop-Scheffer proposes to develop more common infrastructure, for example for strategic airlift8, and common funding of the employment of the NATO Response Force. Question is who gets better from this? The purpose seems rather to move a part of the US defense bill towards Europe. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan cost the US a lot of money. During the Iraq war in 1991 this bill was to a large extent paid by other countries like Saoudi-Arabia and Japan. Going to war unilaterally does not get as easy financed by others. When such operations and the following occupations are paid through NATO common funding, the pressure on the US budget softens. Also the infrastructure mentioned like strategic airlift is now mostly US infrastructure. Such common funding can make countries loose the control on their defense budget. Who does not want to follow the US demand to spend more on defense, receives the bill anyway through the NATO common funding. Three: the 'constructive abstainment'? A third proposal is to change NATO decision making. Today NATO takes decisions by consensus. By consequence one country can block a NATO decision. Proposals circulate to introduce a 'constructive abstainment' or majority decision making. Together with the proposal for more common funding, both proposals can make a country paying for an operation which it opposed. Four: NATO and homeland security With terrorism as the new enemy NATO's working area changes. Aznar makes in his report “NATO: An Alliance for Freedom”9 several far-reaching proposals. He wants NATO to take up homeland security as a part of its collective defense role. Anti-terrorism policy has to become integrated in NATO. Aznar proposes that NATO also has Council meetings by the ministers of home affairs affairs, as well as the creation of a 'counter-terrorism command'. At this moment the EU is the main player for anti-terrorism policy and judicial co-operation. A new NATO Council with the ministers of home affairs would make the US an important player in the European justice and home affairs policy. The second proposal, a counter-terrorism command, gives the military a greater role in the internal anti-terrorism policy. Its mission would be to develop common concepts and doctrines, formulate recommendations on weapons and material, etc for the anti-terrorism missions of the member countries' armed forces. Policymakers are tempted to give NATO or armed forces in general a role in the internal anti-terrorism policy. NATO AWACS-planes are deployed to protect summits and sport manifestations like the Olympic Games. Do we want this? The US approaches terrorism as a military problem, while the Europeans mainly dealt with terrorism through the police and justice. Developing a common line would lead to taking over a more military approach. This creates problems concerning democratic control. These problems turn up already now with accepting foreign police on each others territory or the policial information exchange. The scandal around phone tapping in Greece proves it can be worse. During the Olympic Games mobile phones were tapped of more than hundred people, from the prime minister and other members of government to members of action groups. Was this part of the security operation? The NATO transformation debate NATO discusses transformation already for a long time. The discussion continues since the end of the Cold War. Little by little NATO adopted an interventionist role in a gradually larger territory. The attacks of 11th September 2001 can be seen as the start of the current phase in this debate. The US considered NATO as irrelevant: badly suited military capabilities and slow decision making. The National Defense University developed the American answers to the military problem and formulated the concept of a 'NATO Response Force'. US secretary of defense Rumsfeld adopted this proposal and proposed it at the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002. The NATO Response Force became the new rapid intervention force of NATO. Together with a reform of the headquarters and the Capabilities Initiative, by which short-falls in material needed for operations on a global scale have to be solved, this forms the first part of the transformation agenda today. The NATO Response Force is in full development, the headquarter reform was put in practice. The Capabilities Initiative has less succes. This part of the transformation process is purely military. The political question, what is the purpose of NATO, was not raised. NATO has no clear enemy against which a strategy can be developed, which then can steer the planning processes. Without such a clear strategy the military can not do their job. A political decision on what roles NATO has to take is needed. At the Summit of Istanbul a process was started to develop a Comprehensive Political Guidance to answer some of these questions. It had to be ready by end 2005, but this timing was not reached. It is now ready, allthough it is a vague text which does not touch the fundamental political questions and will be presented at the Riga summit. These questions were touched upon by the German Chancellor Schröder. On the Munich security conference in 2005 he stated that NATO “was no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies”. Schröder received harsh criticism by the more atlantist political minds. It was clear the political debate about NATO's purpose and aims was inevitable. At the conclusion of their February meeting in Brussels, NATO government leaders stated “We are committed to strengthening NATO’s role as a forum for strategic and political consultation and coordination among Allies, while reaffirming its place as the essential forum for security consultation between Europe and North America.” This political discussion forms the next part of the NATO transformation discussion. The timing of this discussion got shape. The first conclusions will be made by the summit of government leaders in Riga in November 2006. This discussion will be finalized at the next summit of government leaders in spring 2008. Just in time to be part of the legacy of US president Bush. At this moment this NATO transformation debate is only one between government leaders and policy makers. But the results of this debate will have a profound impact on how our world looks like. Do we really want such a NATO, or a NATO at all? It is time to start a broader political debate on this! 1. http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=170& 2. http://www.fundaes.es/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf 3. http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=169& 4. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/490/69421/ 5. http://www.faz.net/s/RubFC06D389EE76479E9E76425072B196C3/Doc~E3360CACC7ACA4773BFD238C8D98E5D61~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html 6. http://news.ft.com/cms/s/2f674ca0-8c37-11da-9efb-0000779e2340.html 7. http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/print.cfm?story=98551&ran=136030; http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374 8. http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=169& 9. http://www.fundaes.es/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf 10. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060317a.htm 11. http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/04-april/e0427c.htm
The attacks of 11th September 2001 marked the final end of the old NATO-politics. NATO was founded as an alliance to collectively defend the territory of its member states. With the end of the Cold War disappeared the main threat for an attack on that territory and NATO started searching for new aims. The member states decided in 2002 that NATO operations were not limited to its own territory or region but could take place everywhere. Our security is influenced globally and by consequence NATO has to operate globally, is the legitimating reasoning. Only four years later the US wants to go a step further with NATO.
Policymakers outlined the upcoming NATO-debate: One: If our security is influenced globally, why limit its partners or NATO-membership to the European region? Why do not ask Japan or Australia as new NATO members? In Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere co-operation with these countries already takes place. Why not broaden and structure this co-operation? Two: Till now every country bears itself the costs of its troops when they participate in a NATO-operation. Common funding is very limited. Why not have common funding for military operations independent of the participation of a country in an operation? Three: Now decisions are made by consensus and can one country block a NATO decision. A 'constructive abstainment' or majority decision making, would that not be more efficient? Four: With terrorism as new enemy the working area of NATO changes. Does NATO has to receive a place in the inner affairs policy against terrorism? Taken together these proposals are a frontal attack on the UN and the EU. NATO would develop from a European-American military alliance into a global collective security organisation. A 'United Nations of the willing', which would marginalise the existing United Nations. What would this mean for countries who do not participate in this military alliance and can potentially be defined by it as a security problem? For them this development is a threat which they will try to counter militarily on their turn. The results are a new arms race and a growing militarisation of the international relations. The proposition that threats are global could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. One: NATO as a global collective security organisation? After 11th September 2001 the US considered NATO as useless. They formed the 'coalition of the willing' and decided unilaterally to attack and occupy Iraq. Afterwards the US was confronted with the limits of this approach. The war costs too much, the US Army gets overstretched and the US was internationally isolated. The second term of Bush as president was marked by a new openess for co-operation. The US NATO-ambassador Nuland stated on 7th December 2005 in Le Monde that the Iraq discussions learned a lesson: NATO has to be the place where all future security problems have to be discussed. As examples she names the Middle-East, Iraq, Iran but also China and North-Korea. The German Chancellor Merkel supports this proposal1, as well as the Netherlands. The former Spanish prime minister Aznar takes in his report “NATO: An Alliance for Freedom”2 some steps further. He proposes to offer NATO membership to Israel and to make links with other countries active in the war against terrorism. As example he names Colombia and India. These ideas are not on the official NATO agenda yet, but show where hardcore Atlantics are aiming at. NATO secretary general De Hoop-Scheffer stated on the Munich Security Conference in 2006: “We need to ensure that we have the closest possible partnership with those countries that can, and are willing to, help defend our shared values. To my mind, that means also building closer links with other likeminded nations beyond Europe - nations such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea or Japan. NATO is not a global policeman, but we have increasingly global partnerships.”3 Contacts with the named countries are already taking place for a while. New Zealand and Australia signed the past months a treaty with NATO on exchange of classified information. A small technical step to ease the military co-operation but it was accompanied with statements about the aim to develop closer links. The ministers of foreign affairs of South Korea and Japan visited NATO in December and January. This proposal for closer links was already discussed inside NATO in January4. The US NATO-ambassador Nuland proposed a permanent panel with these countries.Now these proposals have made it to the official agenda10. New partnerships and new formats for older ones were discussed at the informal NATO summit of ministers of foreign affairs in Sofia on 27-28 April11. And the discussion is clearly placed on the agenda for the Riga summit. These steps are not as evident as it may sound. Partnerships with Japan and Australia give NATO suddenly a role in the Pacific and change fundamentally our relation with China. Membership, allthough not on the agenda now, would imply that the collective defense guarantee is broadened to countries in the Pacific. It turns NATO in a worldwide military alliance. Europe would automatically be dragged into a conflict in the Pacific. The First World War showed how a local conflict can grow into a global one through local military alliance treaties. Military circles in the US often predict that the next great conflict will be with China. Do we really want to be part of that? Till now we have one global security organisation, the United Nations. Security problems are treated by the Security Council. When consensus on security problems is first formed in a global NATO, the discussion in the Security Council will be reduced to a pro forma exercise to legitimate a NATO decision or operation. When Russia or China are unwilling to give this legitimation, it will be tempting to act alone as NATO. NATO would become the main global security organisation with its own military apparatus, while the most important political contradictions are laid outside the organisation. What would be the reaction of countries who do not belong to the 'willing' or the 'chosen'? How is it to be outside of the 'right' side? They will be confronted with a global military alliance who can consider them as a security problem. They will try to defend. Result is an arms race and a militarisation of the international relations. Two: 'Common Funding'? The second proposal in the debate on a new NATO concerns common funding. At this moment every country bears itself the costs for the troops it contributes to a NATO operation. Only a limited amount of infrastructure is funded through a common budget, like the AWACS-planes or the storage bunkers for US nuclear weapons in Europe. NATO Secretary General De Hoop-Scheffer5, the US NATO-ambassador Nuland6 and the NATO Supreme Commander in Europe Jones7 state that this way of financing limits participation in operations. With common funding would smaller countries be able to contribute easier to operations. De Hoop-Scheffer proposes to develop more common infrastructure, for example for strategic airlift8, and common funding of the employment of the NATO Response Force. Question is who gets better from this? The purpose seems rather to move a part of the US defense bill towards Europe. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan cost the US a lot of money. During the Iraq war in 1991 this bill was to a large extent paid by other countries like Saoudi-Arabia and Japan. Going to war unilaterally does not get as easy financed by others. When such operations and the following occupations are paid through NATO common funding, the pressure on the US budget softens. Also the infrastructure mentioned like strategic airlift is now mostly US infrastructure. Such common funding can make countries loose the control on their defense budget. Who does not want to follow the US demand to spend more on defense, receives the bill anyway through the NATO common funding. Three: the 'constructive abstainment'? A third proposal is to change NATO decision making. Today NATO takes decisions by consensus. By consequence one country can block a NATO decision. Proposals circulate to introduce a 'constructive abstainment' or majority decision making. Together with the proposal for more common funding, both proposals can make a country paying for an operation which it opposed. Four: NATO and homeland security With terrorism as the new enemy NATO's working area changes. Aznar makes in his report “NATO: An Alliance for Freedom”9 several far-reaching proposals. He wants NATO to take up homeland security as a part of its collective defense role. Anti-terrorism policy has to become integrated in NATO. Aznar proposes that NATO also has Council meetings by the ministers of home affairs affairs, as well as the creation of a 'counter-terrorism command'. At this moment the EU is the main player for anti-terrorism policy and judicial co-operation. A new NATO Council with the ministers of home affairs would make the US an important player in the European justice and home affairs policy. The second proposal, a counter-terrorism command, gives the military a greater role in the internal anti-terrorism policy. Its mission would be to develop common concepts and doctrines, formulate recommendations on weapons and material, etc for the anti-terrorism missions of the member countries' armed forces. Policymakers are tempted to give NATO or armed forces in general a role in the internal anti-terrorism policy. NATO AWACS-planes are deployed to protect summits and sport manifestations like the Olympic Games. Do we want this? The US approaches terrorism as a military problem, while the Europeans mainly dealt with terrorism through the police and justice. Developing a common line would lead to taking over a more military approach. This creates problems concerning democratic control. These problems turn up already now with accepting foreign police on each others territory or the policial information exchange. The scandal around phone tapping in Greece proves it can be worse. During the Olympic Games mobile phones were tapped of more than hundred people, from the prime minister and other members of government to members of action groups. Was this part of the security operation? The NATO transformation debate NATO discusses transformation already for a long time. The discussion continues since the end of the Cold War. Little by little NATO adopted an interventionist role in a gradually larger territory. The attacks of 11th September 2001 can be seen as the start of the current phase in this debate. The US considered NATO as irrelevant: badly suited military capabilities and slow decision making. The National Defense University developed the American answers to the military problem and formulated the concept of a 'NATO Response Force'. US secretary of defense Rumsfeld adopted this proposal and proposed it at the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002. The NATO Response Force became the new rapid intervention force of NATO. Together with a reform of the headquarters and the Capabilities Initiative, by which short-falls in material needed for operations on a global scale have to be solved, this forms the first part of the transformation agenda today. The NATO Response Force is in full development, the headquarter reform was put in practice. The Capabilities Initiative has less succes. This part of the transformation process is purely military. The political question, what is the purpose of NATO, was not raised. NATO has no clear enemy against which a strategy can be developed, which then can steer the planning processes. Without such a clear strategy the military can not do their job. A political decision on what roles NATO has to take is needed. At the Summit of Istanbul a process was started to develop a Comprehensive Political Guidance to answer some of these questions. It had to be ready by end 2005, but this timing was not reached. It is now ready, allthough it is a vague text which does not touch the fundamental political questions and will be presented at the Riga summit. These questions were touched upon by the German Chancellor Schröder. On the Munich security conference in 2005 he stated that NATO “was no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies”. Schröder received harsh criticism by the more atlantist political minds. It was clear the political debate about NATO's purpose and aims was inevitable. At the conclusion of their February meeting in Brussels, NATO government leaders stated “We are committed to strengthening NATO’s role as a forum for strategic and political consultation and coordination among Allies, while reaffirming its place as the essential forum for security consultation between Europe and North America.” This political discussion forms the next part of the NATO transformation discussion. The timing of this discussion got shape. The first conclusions will be made by the summit of government leaders in Riga in November 2006. This discussion will be finalized at the next summit of government leaders in spring 2008. Just in time to be part of the legacy of US president Bush. At this moment this NATO transformation debate is only one between government leaders and policy makers. But the results of this debate will have a profound impact on how our world looks like. Do we really want such a NATO, or a NATO at all? It is time to start a broader political debate on this! 1. http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=170& 2. http://www.fundaes.es/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf 3. http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=169& 4. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/490/69421/ 5. http://www.faz.net/s/RubFC06D389EE76479E9E76425072B196C3/Doc~E3360CACC7ACA4773BFD238C8D98E5D61~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html 6. http://news.ft.com/cms/s/2f674ca0-8c37-11da-9efb-0000779e2340.html 7. http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/print.cfm?story=98551&ran=136030; http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374 8. http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=169& 9. http://www.fundaes.es/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf 10. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060317a.htm 11. http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/04-april/e0427c.htm